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On October 15, 1854, American statesmen James Buchanan, J.Y. Mason, and Pierre
Soulé convened in Ostend, Belgium to discuss the American acquisition of Cuba. The
conference resulted in a document known as the Ostend Manifesto, which the New York Herald
leaked to the American public the following year. Among its most controversial statements, the
manifesto asserted that “[if] Cuba, in the possession of Spain, seriously endanger[s] […] the
existence of our cherished Union […] we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain.” The
manifesto encountered backlash from multiple sectors. Opposers worried about the high price of
the acquisition and the toll it would have on relations with Spain. The matter resurfaced in 1859,
when President Buchanan presented Senate Bill 497 to Congress, asking for a sum of
$30’000’000 to acquire Cuba from Spain. As demonstrated by the heated debates among U.S.
Senators, the bill raised divisions regarding the American economy, the relations between the
U.S. and European powers, and the expansion of slavery into foreign territories. In an attempt to
interpret opposition to the annexation of Cuba in the 1850s, Indiana Senator Albert J. Beveridge
argued that the proposition heightened tensions1 among slaveholding and non-slaveholding states
in the Union and that for these reasons opposers saw it as “impracticable.”2 However, a closer
examination of the Senate speeches regarding the 1859 bill reveals that the reasons behind the
opposition went beyond the institution of slavery. Northern Republican Senators in 1859 also
opposed the annexation of Cuba because they deemed the island’s population to be incompatible
with the Union due to their cultural, religious, and racial difference. The opposers of the bill
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argued that Cuba’s largely Spanish, Catholic, multi-racial population was unable to uphold
American standards of self-government.
Existing analyses of the American acquisition of Cuba scarcely mention this prejudiced
view of the Cuban people. Rather, historians such as Rauch and Ferrer ascribe opposition to the
domestic tensions around slavery. The argument of anti-Cuban prejudice illuminates Northern
Republican views on the exclusivity of American institutions. For Northern Republicans, the
incorporation of new territories rested on the possibility of “Americanization.” Cuba’s Catholic,
Spanish, and multiracial characteristics made it incompatible with the idea of America. Often,
Northern Republican senators were more adamant in their prejudiced views than in their
opposition to the expansion of slavery in Cuba. This argument illuminates how anti-slavery
Northerners were also motivated by the preservation of the American ideal, in addition to the
elimination of slavery. Their anti-slavery views often extended only as far as the white,
protestant, American man could reach.
Antecedents and Literature Review
U.S. policymakers had long pondered the acquisition of Cuba for economic, geopolitical,
and ideological reasons. Cuba’s place as one of the largest slaveholding societies in the world
made its markets extremely desirable, especially the sugar market. Its placement on the Gulf of
Mexico and next to the mouth of the Mississippi River made it key for commercial and trade
strategies with the Caribbean. After the acquisition of Florida in 1819, many U.S. statesmen
viewed Cuba as the next logical step, being under a hundred miles away. Many wondered about
the possibility of a European power with a strong navy eventually acquiring Cuba, such as
France or England. This shift in the control of Cuba would place a significant threat to U.S.
sovereignty in the Western Hemisphere. Additionally, in a paternalistic impulse that survived
until the Spanish-American War (1898), U.S. statesmen hoped to liberate Cuba from the
allegedly tyrannical power of Spain, whose prowess was in a state of decline by the loss of its
colonies.
Therefore, when American senators encountered the question of Cuban acquisition in
1859, they were aware that it was nothing new. Like Louisiana Democratic Senator John Slidell
stated in his report of the Bill 497, “the ultimate acquisition of Cuba has long been regarded as
the fixed policy of the United States […] The only difference of opinion is as to the time, mode,
and conditions of obtaining it.”3 In his book American Interest in Cuba 1848-1855, Rauch
analyzes the multiple Early American statesmen that at some point showed interest in the
acquisition of Cuba. Men such as Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams considered Cuba a
crucial commercial and strategic addition to the Union. In a letter to James Monroe in 1823,
Thomas Jefferson stated, “I have ever looked upon Cuba as the most interesting addition which
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could ever be made to our system of states.”4 Jefferson and Adams considered it an American
duty to free the Cuban people of the ostensibly tyrannical Spanish government. According to
Adams, the geographic placement of Cuba would provide the United States with full commercial
access to the Gulf of Mexico, the Mississippi River, as well as the network of the West Indies.5
Yet another major motivation in the acquisition of Cuba, later cited in the Ostend Manifesto, is
its provision of security to the American states from potential slave revolutions which could pour
into the newly acquired, neighboring territories of Louisiana and New Mexico.6
For decades after, U.S. administrations engaged in unsuccessful negotiations with
Spanish powers for the acquisition of Cuba. During the administrations of Van Buren, Taylor,
and Fillmore, these negotiations took a more relaxed stance. These presidents were content with
the government of Spain over Cuba as long as it prevented other European powers such as
Britain and France from controlling the territory.7 Ada Ferrer identifies the Pierce administration
as a point of the reignition of American interest in Cuba. In his inaugural speech in 1853,
Franklin Pierce declared that “[his] Administration will not be controlled by any timid
forebodings of evil from expansion […] our attitude as a nation and our position on the globe
render the acquisition of certain possessions […] eminently important for our protection.”8 This
anti-abolitionist, expansionist administration was further foreshadowed by Vice President
William Rufus King’s recitation of the oath of office from an American-owned sugar plantation
in Cuba, where he sought relief from tuberculosis.9 The next year, in 1854, soon-to-be president
James Buchanan signed the Ostend Manifesto in Belgium. The Ostend Manifesto signified a
shift from negotiation to forceful “wresting” in American policy regarding the acquisition of
Cuba. The writers of the Manifesto made it clear that they were willing to go to great lengths in
order to count Cuba among the U.S.’s possessions.
The Ostend Manifesto
The Ostend Manifesto represented the compilation of all considerations in favor of the
acquisition of Cuba in one document. It emerged after a meeting among James Buchanan, John
Mason, and Pierre Soulé, American ambassadors to England, France, and Spain respectively,
met in Ostend, Belgium in October 1854 to discuss the acquisition of Cuba. The meeting
emerged under the instruction of secretary of state William Marcy, in the face of Southern
pressure to add more slave states to the country. Once the document was leaked, as far as we
know, by the New York Herald and through Pierre Soulé’s indiscreetness, it encountered
backlash from domestic and foreign sectors of opinion. Domestically, members of the
Republican party feared that the pro-slavery democrats held too much power in the Union’s
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decisions. Abroad, the manifesto’s suggestion that the United States could take Cuba by force
aroused suspicion of the U.S.’ expansionist efforts.

Figure 1. The Ostend Doctrine. Lithograph. From Library of Congress.
The above lithograph, created by Nathaniel Currier, exemplifies the backlash against the
Ostend Manifesto. It shows James Buchanan, surrounded by a group of men attempting to take
his hat, coat, watch, and money. In their requests, the men use quotes from the Ostend Manifesto.
This lithograph brings into question the validity of the Manifesto’s claims on Cuba, including the
“danger” of the situation, and the U.S.’ entitlement to “wrest [Cuba]” Additionally, it
exemplifies concerns regarding the corruptibility of the Democratic doctrine present in the
Manifesto, if put into practice. These concerns of corruption carried on to the debates of Senate
Bill 497, and according to historians, signified a motivating factor for the Civil War.
The actual text of the Ostend Manifesto is careful to not explicitly mention the addition
of Cuba as a slaveholding state. Instead, it provides extensive attention to other factors in favor
of the acquisition, such as the geographical proximity of the island. The document places
significant emphasis on the security that the island will provide to the Union. It states that is
numerous streams of commerce would be dangerous to U.S. security in foreign hands.
Additionally, it presents the idea that Cuba’s “system of immigration and labor” threatens an
insurrection that could hurt U.S. interests. This idea certainly stems from the fear of recent slave
insurrections in the Caribbean, such as those of Haiti and Jamaica, and their potential influence
on U.S. shores. The authors state that, unless annexed to the Union, Cuba will become
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“Africanized” and become “a second St. Domingo.” Such a possibility is reason enough for the
United States to be justified in “wresting” Cuba from Spain, by means of war.
The only mention of slavery present in the document complicates historians’ common
view of Cuba as a potential slaveholding state. The authors state that “as long as [Spanish rule]
shall endure, humanity may in vain demand the suppression of the African slave trade in the
island.” They characterize the Spanish rulers on the island as “needy” and “avaricious” for the
immense profit that slavery produces for the island. Therefore, under Spanish rule, the slave
trade would never cease to be in Cuba. This statement implies that were Cuba to be annexed to
the United States, the goal would be to eventually suppress the African slave trade. Evidently,
this sentence aims to please anti-slavery sectors of opinion in the U.S. This is undoubtedly a
stealthy way of addressing the slavery question in the document. However, as discussed in the
1859 debates, this prospect does not necessarily signify that Democrat annexationists aimed to
abolish the slave trade in Cuba. Instead, they hoped to supplant enslaved Africans with American
Southerners as a source for human labor. The plausibility of this suggestion was a subject of
heated discussion during the 1859 Congress.
Senate Bill 497
When James Buchanan presented a bill to the Senate in 1859 asking for a sum of 30’000’00 in
order to “facilitate” the acquisition of Cuba, the senators engaged in a heated debate. This debate
was in constant conversation with the desires of Early American statesmen, as well as the authors
of the Ostend Manifesto. However, the involvement of a large sum of money that would
necessitate significant federal funds heightened the tensions between the Senators. The speeches
are filled with personal attacks, accusations of corruption, and the discrediting of public officials
(including President Buchanan). The debates took place between January and February of 1859
and involved a number of Northern Republican and Southern Democrat Senators. Although their
arguments varied, generally, the Northern Republican Senators opposed the acquisition, while
the Southern Democrats supported it. Louisiana Democrat Senator John Slidell, who succeeded
Pierre Soulé in said office, wrote a report to accompany Bill 497. The report outlined the
arguments supporting the acquisition of Cuba and includes counterarguments to some of the
common claims of the opposition.
Slidell argues that were the U.S. not to acquire Cuba, the two possible alternatives would
include the possession of Cuba by some other European power, such as Britain or France, or the
independence of the island. Slidell states the former alternative would endanger American
security and sovereignty in the Western Hemisphere, while the latter would result in a “Black
Republic” similar to Haiti in its lack of prosperity.10 The Louisiana senator also addresses a
variety of the counterarguments presented at the debate, such as the possibility of offending
Spain through the suggestion to sell Cuba. This consideration hearkens back to the Ostend
Manifesto, which also argues against the idea that Spain will feel offended at the offer to
10

Slidell, “Making Appropriations to Facilitate the Acquisition of the Island of Cuba,” 10.

83

purchase. Slidell states that due to the U.S.’ willingness to pay a large sum of money for the
island, Spain should present no objections. Furthermore, Slidell also argues against the idea that
the population of Cuba is unfit for the Union. Slidell states, “the white creole is as free from all
taint of African blood as the descendant of the Goth from the plains of Castile.”11 This statement
immediately caught my attention. Why did a pro-slavery Southern statesman feel the need to
argue for Cuban whiteness in these debates on annexation? Was the existence of a predominantly
white population a precondition for the annexation of territory to the United States? Which
sectors of opinion was Slidell trying to appeal to in this statement? These are the questions that
motivated this paper.
In order to answer these questions, this analysis looked at a number of speeches by
Northern Republican Senators delivered at the 1859 debates on Bill 497. These include
Zachariah Chandler of Michigan, James Dixon of Connecticut, James Rood Doolittle of
Wisconsin, and Jacob Collamer of Vermont. All of these senators opposed the acquisition of
Cuba. Likewise, every single one of these senators claimed to hold anti-slavery views, and
eventually supported the Lincoln administration during the Civil War. For contrast, this essay
also looked at the speeches of a few Southern Democrats, including John Slidell of Louisiana,
Tristen W. Polk of Missouri, and Judah P. Benjamin of Louisiana. The rhetoric of these debates
allows for a deeper understanding of the cultural, religious, and racial considerations that went
into the acquisition of Cuba. The Northern Republican Senator’s speeches provide insight into
the specific prejudices that convinced them Cubans were incapable of self-government, and thus
incompatible with the Union. This analysis puts the Senator’s anti-slavery views in question. Did
their convictions come from a place of humanity and respect of other races, or rather social
convenience?
This argument is also in conversation with Michel Gobat’s Empire by Invitation by
suggesting that contradictory dynamics were at play in American Northerners’ interest in Cuba
and Nicaragua in the 1850s. Gobat’s book focuses on William Walker’s filibuster expedition to
Nicaragua in the 1850s. Gobat views Walker’s filibuster regime in Nicaragua, composed largely
of American Northerners, not as an effort to extend slavery Southward but as an attempt to
spread American democratic ideals in Central America. Therefore, Walker’s expansionist
ambitions served the larger Manifest Destiny project of the mid-19th century. This essay finds
different dynamics at play in the Northern opinion of Cuban acquisition. Are Northern statesmen
similarly interested in expanding Democratic ideals into Cuba? The sources suggest quite the
opposite— Northern statesmen dismissed Cuba as unfit for the proliferation of American
democratic ideals. This disparity in the Northern perspective of Nicaragua and Cuba in the 1850s
can perhaps be attributed to the perceived willingness of Nicaraguan people to accept Walker’s
regime. By contrast, Northern Republicans in 1859 considered that Cubans would be reluctant to
assimilate to American institutions.
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Discussion: The Debates
In February of 1859, a number of American Senators engaged in a heated debate
regarding an island off the coast of Florida. In front of them stood a request from Democrat
President James Buchanan asking for $30’000’000 to “facilitate” the acquisition of Cuba. Many
interpreted this wording as a potential bribe of the Spanish crown. Ever since the divulgation of
the Ostend Manifesto, and the diplomatic backlash that it produced, the Cuban question had been
relatively silent. Yet these representatives faced the question of whether they should grant the
President access to this large sum of money. Louisiana Democratic Senator John Slidell
introduced the bill with strong argumentation in favor of the acquisition. His report, printed on
January 24, 1859, includes an in-depth financial analysis of the profits of Cuba’s sugar industry.
Slidell played an important role in the declaration of the Mexican-American War in 1846. He
was elected to Senate in 1853, where he advocated against the Missouri Compromise and for the
Kansas-Nebraska Act. In 1859, he was one of seven members of the Committee of Foreign
Relations, along with Polk and Crittenden, also present at the Bill 497 debate. Later in life, he
allied with the pro-slavery, secessionist “Fire-Eaters” and became a pro-Confederacy diplomat in
France.
One of the first responses to Slidell’s report was that of Wisconsin Republican Senator
James Rood Doolittle, delivered on February 11. Originally, Doolittle belonged to the antislavery Barnburner section of the Democratic Party, and in 1857 switched over to the Republican
Party. In spite of his anti-slavery views, Doolittle was a staunch opposer of the 15th Amendment
during the Reconstruction era. At the 1859 debates, although he opposed Cuban acquisition, his
stance was rather moderate, much like the rest of his political endeavors. Doolittle agreed with
Slidell that Cuban acquisition was the eventual destiny of the Union. However, he believed that
then was not the right time for the acquisition to happen. His oppositions were rather logistical:
he wanted Spain to voluntarily renounce Cuba, and he wanted a majority of the white male
population of Cuba to vote in favor of the transfer. Pushing back against the Ostend Manifesto,
Doolittle stated, “unless Spain offers to sell Cuba, we should not take it by force.”12
Doolittle’s speech took a turn when he revealed that he hoped to acquire not only Cuba
but also parts of Central and South America, in order to provide for the emigration of all people
of color in the Union. This prospect of emigration seems to be one of his key convictions,
considering that he delivered an entire speech to Congress on April 11, 1862, advocating for
“homesteads for black men in the tropics—white immigration to and black emigration from the
United States.” In 1859, he proposed the eventual “colonization of Central America” through
acquisition or negotiation with the “tropical states” Doolittle considered slavery to be a declining
institution and wondered what white American statesmen would “do with” all the people of color
in the Union once there was no more use for them.13 This statesman holds an interesting
definition of abolition as the gradual dissolution of slavery into the regions of Mexico and
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Central and South America.14 Doolittle’s arguments suggest that he did not oppose the institution
of slavery itself, but rather its proximity to the predominantly white states of the Union. As long
as slavery was outside of his view, Doolittle was satisfied. His arguments also point at the
assumption that there was a fundamental separation between the Union as it stood and the areas
of Central and South America. Even if included in the Union, Doolittle would never regard Cuba
as an equal to the other American states, but rather as a dumping ground for the evils of slavery.
Although Doolittle’s views were not popular among the debaters—his name was seldom
brought except in the spirit of ridicule—, his opinions were symptomatic of a larger issue in
American opinion of Cuba. For these senators, regardless of their party or geographical
affiliation, the value of Cuba was inherently tied to the institution of slavery. This is why not
even anti-slavery Senators considered abolition in Cuba a plausible prospect.15 If slavery were to
cease to exist on the island, it would descend into the state of Haiti or Jamaica. This
condemnation was not only due to the dependence of the island’s economy on slavery-related
commodities but also on the inability of the population for self-government. Therefore, it was an
underlying assumption that, were the U.S. to acquire Cuba, it would also acquire the 400’000
enslaved people who worked on the island.16 Southern Democrat Senator Judah P. Benjamin was
one of the strongest proponents of the decay of Cuba upon the abolition of slavery. He stated in
his speech, “the population, wealth, and the prosperity of Cuba, are dependent solely on a system
of compulsory labor, without which she must inevitably relapse into the condition of Hayti.”17
Benjamin utilized this fear of “Africanization,” which he predicted would happen were Cuba to
remain in Spanish hands, as an argument in favor of the acquisition.
The point where Republican and Democrat senators diverge is on the capacity of Cuba to
practice self-government in equality to the existing states. In his speech, also delivered on
February 11th, Benjamin proposed that the U.S. acquisition of Cuba would signify an “admission
to self-government.”18 He opposed this mode of government to the subjugation and imposition of
the Spanish. He stated that “she [Cuba] shall unite with us freely, an equal associate of the free
States.”19 Quite explicitly in his speech, Benjamin stated that Cuba was capable of practicing two
key American values: freedom and equality. After February 11, the increase in assertions of
Cuban incompatibility with American institutions signals a retaliation against Benjamin’s
suggestions. Consequent Northern Republican speakers Chandler, Collamer, and Dixon found
Benjamin’s granting of self-government to Cubans a scandalous proposition.
Next in the line of the debate was Republican Zachariah Chandler of Michigan, who
delivered an anti-acquisition speech on February 17, 1859. Zachariah T. Chandler, first a
member of the Whig Party, then one of the founders of the Republican party in 1854 was a
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strong anti-slavery activist and, during the Civil War, an advocate for the incorporation of
African Americans into the Union army. Chandler identified with the Radical Republicans, who
opposed the Fugitive Slave Act and supported the abolition of slavery. However, Chandler’s
views seem much less radical upon the examination of his speech. In his speech, Chandler first
argued against the acquisition of Cuba for economic reasons. He pointed at the bankruptcy of the
American treasury, and the possibility of President Buchanan utilizing the requested funds for
the restoration of the deteriorated Democratic Party.20 For Chandler, Buchanan’s request of such
a large sum of money to the American Congress was a sign of corruption.
Later in his speech, Chandler went on a tirade against the idea that Cuba merited joining
the Union, which was most likely addressing Benjamin’s claims. By referencing his recent trips
to the island, Chandler established that the Cuban population and environment were not fit for
their incorporation into the United States. Of white Cubans, he wrote, “they are an ignorant,
vicious, priest-ridden set.”21 Chandler said that Cubans were enamored with Catholicism and that
there was no “such thing as a love of liberty here.”22 Additionally, he stated that Cuba was an
improper place for Northern men to emigrate to, given the number of tropical diseases and
animals that would assail them at all times.23 In line with the association of Cuba’s value to
slavery, Chandler seemed uninterested in promoting the abolition of slavery in Cuba. His chief
concern was the unfitness of the white population, which due to its religious and cultural
differences from white Americans, would be unable to practice liberty and self-government,
which he considered key American values. Chandler does not deny that Cuban creoles were
white but instead argued that they carried a corrupted kind of whiteness, one associated with
criminality and bondage. Chandler’s condemnation of the Catholic and Spanish influence on the
Cuban population seems to be in line with the heightened anti-Catholic and nativist ideologies in
the 1850s, as evidenced by Know-Nothingism.24
Furthermore, Chandler’s argumentation came with an idealization of the West as a
territory more fitting for expansion than Cuba. He stated that, even though Cuban land is
considered fertile for its facility with tropical commodities such as sugar, “it is in no way
comparable to the prairies and bottom-lands of the Great West.”25 While Chandler saw the
population of Cuba as an obstacle to expansion, he considered the Western territories to be
largely unpeopled. Addressing Senator Benjamin, Chandler said, “You have hundreds of acres of
land to which you can extinguish the Indian title for a song and obtain better lands and create
better states than you will ever make out of Cuba.”26 Not only is this a direct dismissal of Indian
sovereignty, but it also illustrates that in order for a territory to be fit for the Union, American
20

This suggestion here hearkens back to the debates surrounding the Ostend Manifesto, which denounced the
possible corruption of pro-slavery Democrat officials.
21
Zachariah Chandler, “Acquisition of Cuba,” (Washington, DC, 1859), 5.
22
Chandler, “Acquisition of Cuba,” 6.
23
Ibid.
24
Ray Allen Billington, The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860; a Study of the Origins of American Nativism, (New
York: Macmillan, 1938).
25
Chandler, “Acquisition of Cuba,” 5.
26
Ibid.

87

whiteness must be able to predominate. Chandler regarded the West as “unpeopled,” therefore
the obstacles that the Cuban population signified for American institutions were not present.
Perhaps one of the most elaborate opposition speeches was that of Vermont Republican
Senator Jacob Collamer on February 21st, where he built on Chandler’s views. His speech was
very much aware of the antecedents in Cuban acquisition, even going as far as calling the debate
a “second edition of the Ostend Conference.”27 Collamer argued that Slidell’s report and the
Ostend Manifesto share a key commonality: the belief that it is the destiny of the Union to
expand. By contrast, he believed that the Union has already expanded enough, considering its
recent acquisitions of Florida and Texas. Therefore, the acquisition of Cuba would be
unnecessary for the Union. He states, “we could shovel up the whole of [Cuba] into ships and
dump it off into the Atlantic Ocean […] The idea that the possession of Cuba is necessary […] is
an actual figment of the imagination.”28 Collamer’s assertions built on Chandler’s idea that Cuba
is of very little value for the United States without the institution of slavery. He called the
prospect of abolishing the slave trade in Cuba a “delusion.”29
Similar to his fellow so-called anti-slavery senators, Collamer seemed unexcited about
the prospect of abolishing the slave trade in Cuba. In fact, Collamer’s views on slavery appear
very moderate in his words, “my opinion is that any people who desire to have slaves and will
pay enough for them can have them in any country.”30 This view seems rather inconsistent for an
anti-slavery senator who later provided legal aid to Abraham Lincoln in the Emancipation
Proclamation31. However, if we consider the postulate that Collamer held different standards on
anti-slavery for territories inside and outside the Union, his views suddenly seem perfectly
consistent. Collamer’s advocacy for anti-slavery extended only as far as the American white
man’s reach.
Collamer is by far the most vocal senator about the racial tensions that the acquisition of
Cuba aroused. In response to the possibility of ending the African slave trade in Cuba and,
instead, supplying the island with enslaved workers from the American South, Collamer stated
that Southern slaveholders would be unwilling. He said that Southern slaveholders would be
fearful of “the border slave states being shaved off into what they call, if you please, abolition.”32
Collamer’s way of bringing the word “abolition” into the conversation suggests that there is great
tension around it. When questioned by Slidell on his opinions on Southerners, Collamer stated
that he doesn’t wish to have any written record of him supporting the slave trade.33 His response
signals a greater preoccupation with his public image rather than his ideological convictions.
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Additionally, Collamer goes as far as to assert that Southern secessionists may have been
wanting to incorporate Cuba in order to have access to the mouth of the Mississippi River after
their separation from the Union.34 His arguments evidence that Collamer was aware of the stark
factional divide between pro-slavery and anti-slavery Senators on the topic of acquisition.
Therefore, we can also understand his anti-slavery views as a factional commitment, rather than
an ideological proposition. In order words, anti-slavery was a part of Collamer’s discourse
against the Southern Senators and the looming threat of secession.
In his speech, Collamer builds on the incompatibility of the Cuban population with
American institutions due to its cultural habits and Catholicism. Collamer refers to the Union as
a “family,” its members able to harmoniously coexist with others.35 Because Cuba was so
densely populated, it would be hard to Americanize it. Territories such as Florida, by contrast,
had a “scattered” Spanish population, which made it easy to assimilate.36 In reference to Cubans,
Collamer questioned, “Are they a people adapted to our institutions? Are they a people who, if
they understood those institutions, would desire them?” Reminiscent of Chandler’s speech,
Collamer stated that the half a million Spanish creoles on the island were “entirely unintelligent”
and unacquainted with the English language.37 He emphasized freedom of religion as a crucial
value of the Union and considered that the intrusion of the Catholic Church on Cuban affairs
would be detrimental to potential Protestant settlers.38
Furthermore, Collamer rejected the Cuban people on racial grounds, which he established
by comparison to Mexico. Previously, in the House of Representatives, Collamer had opposed
Texan annexation and the Mexican-American War (1848). In the speech, he referred to the failed
attempts to annex Mexico as a slaveholding state. He referred to Mexicans as a people of “mixed
race and blood” who have so far erased the line between Black and White as to be incapable of
self-government.39 In this context, Collamer frames “self-government” as the ability to sustain
the institution of slavery, predicated upon racial discrimination. By comparing Mexico’s racial
composition to Cuba, Collamer asserts that Cuba’s population too would be incapable of
sustaining a self-governing body, being used to Spanish governance. Additionally, Collamer
generalizes the people of the tropics as “idle” due to the large availability of fruit in their
surroundings.40 Because the racial difference was not as marked in Mexico and Cuba as it was in
the United States, Collamer thought they would be incapable of sustaining themselves as a
slaveholding state. And as established before, Cuba held no value without the institution of
slavery. Therefore, Cuba would be of no benefit to the Union.
Lastly, on February 25th of 1859, Connecticut Republican Senator James Dixon
culminated anti-Cuban discourse by asserting that their white population belonged to a different
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race altogether. James Dixon, like his peers, was an anti-slavery senator. However, he was also
an Episcopalian and sympathized with anti-Catholic sentiments. In his speech, Dixon discussed,
“are [Cubans] fit to come into our government as equals? (…) All Southern senators claim
that the Black portion of that population are unfit for self-government (…) How is it with
the whites? They are not of our race. They are of a race that has never yet succeeded in
self-government.”41

His definition of “race” in this passage combined the considerations of other senators. What
constitutes the “difference” of white Cubans is their affiliations to Catholicism, their history of
Spanish governance, and their cultural and environmental upbringing.
In “othering” white Cubans, Dixon also marked a difference between American
institutions and Cuban institutions. He compared Cuba to a number of other American territories
and argued that territories such as Massachusetts and Connecticut had been practicing selfgovernment long before the Revolution. He engaged in a sort of “the chicken or the egg”
discourse by wondering whether the institutions make the people, or the people make the
institutions. He concluded that the American longstanding tradition of self-governance, even
under British rule, was what created the institutions of liberty and equality. Therefore, these
institutions could not apply to those who have not practiced self-governance before (i.e., Cuba).
With regards to the newly acquired territories of Louisiana and Florida, Dixon stated that they
were largely unpeopled and that their Spaniard populations did not get seats in the Senate.42
These considerations drove Dixon to deem the Cuban population incapable of practicing
American institutions.
Although this study is not an exhaustive analysis of all the anti-acquisition speeches
delivered in the Senate between January and February of 1859, the speeches of Doolittle,
Chandler, Collamer, and Dixon, provide powerful insight into the Northern Republican view of
Cuba’s population. Although Senators such as Chandler and Dixon mentioned the environmental
factors of the island and their supposed inhospitality to American settlers, their concerns largely
centered on the island’s population and their inability to assimilate into the Union. All the
Senators arrived at the conclusion that Cubans are incompatible with American institutions.
Although sometimes defined as equality, liberty, or self-government, the apparent ambiguity of
these “institutions” is perhaps a tool to obscure the prejudiced views of these Senators. Their
prejudice stems from multiple grounds, including the anti-Catholic sentiments that were common
among Protestant Americans at the time, the characterization of the Spanish population as lazy or
uninterested in liberty, and the lack of a white population by Northern standards. These factors
compounded in a near racialization of not only the Black population in Cuba but also the white
population, by the assertion of their difference from American whiteness. This idea reinforced

James Dixon, “Speech of Hon. James Dixon, of Connecticut, on the Thirty Million Bill, for the Acquisition of
Cuba,” (Washington, DC, 1859), 24.
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the exclusivity of American institutions and values, which was a common discourse among
Nativist sectors of opinion.
Going back to the conversation with Gobat’s argument, this analysis provides insight into
the comparison between Cuba and Nicaragua. Since Northern American statesmen saw in the
Walker regime a solid opportunity to promulgate American democratic ideals to Nicaragua, they
were more willing to support his expedition. In Cuba, by contrast, Northerners had little proof of
the population’s willingness to cooperate with the Union. Therefore, they held little interest in
spreading American institutions into Cuba.
This analysis also ultimately showed how Northern Republican senators considered antislavery itself to be an exclusively white, Protestant, American value. The Senators suggest that
the only territories that have value without slavery are those that are dominated by a white and
Protestant American population. Therefore, they are quick to betray their anti-slavery views
when considering the American annexation of Cuba. For these senators, the need to preserve
American exclusive values was more important than the elimination of slavery. A variety of
questions remain from this study, including the role of the antebellum tensions in these debates,
and how the Cuban question ultimately motivated the Civil War.
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